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Sri Lanka continues to demonstrate the challenges of implementing legitimate transitional 
justice mechanisms in a post-conflict state ruled by its victors. While the island-nation of Sri 
Lanka has managed to sustain relative peace for over a decade, the government’s outstanding 
human rights record remains a concern for the country’s minority ethnic groups. While there 
is substantial evidence against the Sri Lankan Army to validate the human rights abuses and 
war crimes alleged by Tamil civilians, little has been done to hold these individuals 
accountable. Within the sphere of liberal international order, a victor’s peace, such as Sri 
Lanka’s, would likely face Western pressure to abide by international law and prosecute these 
individuals, at the risk of facing economic repercussions. Nonetheless, Sri Lanka has refused 
to prosecute any government officials or Sri Lankan Army officers; yet, their post-war 
economy has nearly wholly recovered, due to its increasingly close relations with China. On 
this premise, this paper will analyze how China continues to defy liberal international norms, 
as demonstrated by the Sino-Lankan relationship. This paper will begin by defining transitional 
justice and the liberal international norms fostered by Western hegemony for the later portion 
of the twentieth century. It will then proceed by discussing how China has challenged liberal 
international norms in recent decades, through its growing economic dominance and vested 
international interests. This paper will then analyze the war crimes and human rights violations 
that took place during Sri Lanka’s civil war and the failing transitional justice mechanisms that 
followed. Finally, this paper will conclude with an in-depth analysis of the Sino-Lankan 
relationship. Ultimately, this paper will argue that China is able to challenge Western norms 
and liberal international order, by providing an appealing alternative model for illiberal states, 
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The case of Sri Lanka and its increasingly close relationship with China serves as an 
example of the emerging authoritarian alternatives to the dominant narrative of liberal 
peacebuilding. While liberal international norms have remained the prevailing discourse since 
World War II, the resurgence of China and Russia has produced new challenges for liberal 
international order and Western influence.1 Western liberal norms, championed by the United 
States throughout the twentieth century have focused on “open markets, multilateral institutions, 
cooperative security, shared sovereignty, and the rule of law.”2 The concept of transitional justice 
is often thought to be a by-product of the Western liberal vision due to its emphasis on individual 
rights, obligations and accountability.3 Transitional justice as a practice has traditionally referred 
to the mechanisms a post-conflict state can undertake in order to transition towards democracy, 
however in recent years this has devolved to a basic acknowledgement of past violations and 
abuses.4 While transitional justice is often associated with mechanisms such as truth 
commissions or accountability of perpetrators, it may also include “longer-term institutional 
reforms of the judiciary, security forces and the like.”5 More authoritarian regimes, such as 
China and Sri Lanka, have argued that these peacebuilding efforts often have ulterior motives 
and seek to emulate Western visions of governance and institutions.6 
 
1 David Lewis, “Sri Lanka’s Schmittian Peace: Sovereignty, Enmity and Illiberal Order.” Conflict, Security & 
Development 20.1(2020): 17. 
2 John G. Ikenberry, “Why the Liberal World Order Will Survive.” Ethics & International Affairs 32.1(2018): 23. 
3 Chandra Lekha Sriram, “Justice as Peace? Liberal Peacebuilding and Strategies of Transitional Justice.” Global 
Society 21.4(2007): 590.  
4 Paige Arthur, “How ‘Transitions’ Reshaped Human Rights: A conceptual History of Transitional Justice.” Human 
Rights Quarterly 31.2 (2009): 324. 
5 Chandra Lekha Sriram, 591.  
6 Ibid., 588. 
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 While the Chinese style of governance has remained in stark opposition to the Western 
liberal international order since the end of WWII, China’s foreign policy efforts have changed 
significantly within recent decades. Despite American fears of Asian hegemony, “official 
Chinese statements constantly reiterate the line that China does not and will not ever seek 
hegemony, either in Asia or elsewhere.”7 This does not appease American concerns, as Chinese 
foreign policy remains appealing, in its simple offer as an alternative to prevailing standards and 
norms.8 This can be seen through China’s high regard for state sovereignty, and a clear effort to 
refrain from imposing belief systems, policies or values on other countries.9 This is best 
described by an Australian official interviewed by Lampton, claiming China finds its strength in 
“‘negative soft power – at times, not being the US is enough to improve China’s international 
image.”10Additionally, much of China’s growth in soft power in recent decades lies in growing 
fatigue and distrust with Western liberal political and economic norms; particularly in states 
located in the global south.11 China offers a model of illiberal peace that values sovereignty and 
is willing to construct strong economic relationships without the imposition of any particular 
belief system, creating an appealing alternative for authoritarian governments, such as Sri 
Lanka.12 
The significance of the Sino-Lankan relationship, in relation to illiberal peace and 
transitional justice, begins with the war crimes that took place during Sri Lanka’s 30-year civil 
war. Sri Lanka suffered violent ethnic conflict for nearly three decades, beginning with the 
violent mobilization of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in 1983, and ending with 
 
7 Shaun Breslin, “Understanding China’s Regional Rise: Interpretations, Identities and Implications,” International 
Affairs 85.4 (2009): 819.  
8 Ibid., 823.  
9 Ibid., 825.  
10 Ibid., 826. 
11 Ibid., 831.  
12 David Lewis, “Sri Lanka’s Schmittian Peace: Sovereignty, Enmity and Illiberal Order,” 18.  
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their bloodied defeat by the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) in 2009.13 The LTTE was 
representative of Sri Lanka’s largest minority, the Hindu Tamils, and their quest for a Tamil 
homeland in the North-East portion of the island.14 While both groups had committed violent 
war crimes throughout the conflict, it was the final months of the conflict that was most 
concerning to international organizations such as the United Nations (UN).15 The estimated death 
toll during the final month of conflict is estimated to be upwards of 300 000 civilians, largely at 
the hands of Sri Lankan forces.16 Tamils were continuously targeted after the LTTE was 
defeated, as a World Report in 2014 describes “torture, rape, detentions, and summary 
executions perpetrated by the Sri Lankan Government against peoples suspected of involvement 
in the defeated Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and government critics.”17 While Sri 
Lanka did construct some transitional justice mechanisms after the civil war, it will become 
evident that these measures made little effort to address the root issues of conflict Sri Lankan 
society.  
 The Sino-Lankan relationship is most significant in this paper to demonstrate the rising 
popularity of China’s foreign policy approach, as well as the general appeal of the ‘Chinese 
Model.’ Relations between Sri Lanka and China became suggestively closer in 2005 when China 
expressed its full support for President Rajapaksa, who was unwavering in his pursuit to defeat 
the LTTE by any means necessary.18 President Rajapaksa’s military approach was not well 
received by Western powers, as they “had criticized Rajapaksa for continuing with the military 
 
13 Christopher Powell and Amarnath Amarasingam, “Understanding Atrocities: Remembering, Representing, and 
Teaching Genocide.” University of Calgary Press (2017): 26. 
14 Ibid., 26.  
15 Ibid.  
16 Kurtz, Gerrit, and Madhan Mohan Jaganathan. "Protection in Peril: Counterterrorism Discourse and International 
Engagement in Sri Lanka in 2009." Global Society 30.1 (2016): 94.  
17 The Lancet. “Human Rights Violations in Sri Lanka.” Lancet, The 383.9929 (2014): 1610. 
18 Patrick Hein, “The Patterns of Chinese Authoritarian Patronage and Implications for Foreign Policy: Lessons 
from Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Cambodia,” Asian Journal of Comparative Politics (2020): 5.  
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offensive against the LTTE and refused to provide financial or economic aid to him, he edged 
closer to Beijing which was a willing partner. 19 From this point forward, China provided 
unconditional financial, military, diplomatic and economic aid for the GoSL, resulting in states 
dependence due to Western embargoes.20 It was from this turning point during the conflict, that 
Sri Lanka became increasingly reliant on China’s economic and diplomatic support, this 
continued into the island’s post-conflict era. This paper will outline how Sri Lanka’s ability to 
circumvent international pressure for accountability is in large part due to China’s unwavering 
diplomatic and economic support.  
The Sino-Lankan relationship will serve as a case study that depicts the global emergence 
of illiberal peace. This case will seek to explore how the Sino-Lankan relationship impedes the 
transitional justice process and fails to reconcile with marginalized minorities in this post-
conflict society. This paper will proceed in a series of successive steps; firstly, by defining 
transitional justice and the Western liberal international norms that are intertwined with this 
process. To continue, it will discuss the various ways in which China is defying liberal 
international norms and its introduction of an illiberal peace. The third chapter of this paper will 
investigate Sri Lanka’s human rights record in depth; this portion will largely refer to state-
sponsored violence against Tamil civilians and the culture of impunity for war crimes. Next, Sri 
Lanka’s transitional justice measures and its continuing failures will be addressed. Finally, this 
paper will conclude with an assessment of the Sino-Lankan relationship, and how China has 
contributed to the state of illiberal peace within Sri Lanka, ultimately, obstructing the potential 
for legitimate transitional justice mechanisms.  
 
 
19 Patrick Hein, 5.  
20 Ibid.  
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Understanding Liberal International Order & Transitional Justice  
1.1 The Rise of the Liberal International Order  
 Liberal International Order (LIO) as it is known today, can be traced back to two historic 
political projects that have evolved over centuries. The first of these being the Peace of 
Westphalia in 1648, and the second being the general construction of a liberal order.21 Both of 
these projects are considered Western visions of global order, with Westphalia emerging from 
Western Europe and liberal order being constructed by the United States following World War 
II.22 These endeavours, ended up reinforcing one another, as the “Westphalian project has 
focused on solving the ‘realist’ problems of creating stable and cooperative interstate relations 
under conditions of anarchy and the liberal-order building project has been possible only when 
relations between the great powers have been stabilized.”23 To begin, the Westphalian state 
system was originally intended to be a political project for Europe but spread rapidly around the 
world in the twentieth century.24 Ultimately, the system was intended to deal with power 
relations while maintaining the importance of state sovereignty.25 This marked the first global 
shift towards a new standard of norms and principles “such as self-determination and mutual 
recognition among sovereign states – have evolved within it, further reinforcing the primacy of 
states and state authority.”26 While Westphalian norms were not received without contestation, 
they were the most resilient and supported aspects of the international system.27 
 
 
21 Hans Kundnani, What is the Liberal International Order? German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2017, 2. 
22 Ibid.  
23 John G. Ikenberry, “The Future of Liberal World Order,” Japanese Journal of Political Science, 16.3 (2015), 59.  
24 John G. Ikenberry, “Why the Liberal World Order Will Survive,” Ethics & International Affairs 32.1(2018): 23.  
25 Hans Kundnani, 2.  
26 John G. Ikenberry, “The Future of Liberal World Order,” 59. 
27 Ibid.  
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The Liberal International Order (LIO) is thought to have emerged following World War 
II when the United States rose to prominence as a hegemon.28 The US championed the idea of a 
‘free world’ during the Cold War, and essentially, “became the ‘first citizen’ of this order, 
providing hegemonic leadership, anchoring the alliances, stabilizing the world economy, 
fostering cooperation and championing ‘free world’ values.”29 This LIO rested on four important 
pillars; liberal values, the expansion of democracy, free trade and multilateral institutions.30 The 
construction of a liberal order was following the growth of democracy globally allowing for an 
evolution of these ideas over time as states grappled with the changes of modernity.31 The 
concept of liberal international order remains a hallmark of the West, “built around bargains, 
institutions, and social purposes that were tied to the West, American leadership and the global 
struggle against Soviet Communism. When the Cold War ended, this ‘inside’ order became the 
‘outside’ order.” 32 However, it is important to note that while the United States has remained the 
global hegemon for over a century, the concept of liberal internationalism was not only a 
historically American vision but collectively westernized effort when discussed alongside the 
Westphalian project.33 
The emergence of LIO marked a transition in the international system, with a peaceful 
transfer of hegemony from the United Kingdom to the United States.34 Following the failed 
League of Nations and the end of WWII, “President Franklin Roosevelt’s administration tried to 
construct liberal order again, embracing a vision of an open trading system and global 
 
28 Jennifer Rudolph, The China Questions: Critical Insights into a Rising Power. Harvard University Press, 2018:  
67. 
29 John G. Ikenberry, “The End of Liberal International Order?” International Affairs 94.1 (2018): 8, 
30 Amitav Acharya, “After Liberal Hegemony: The Advent of a Multiplex World Order,” Ethics & International 
Affairs 31.3 (2017): 272.  
31 Ibid., 8,  
32 John G. Ikenberry, “The End of Liberal International Order?” 9. 
33 John G. Ikenberry, “Why the Liberal Order Will Survive,” 22.  
34 John G. Ikenberry, “The Future of Liberal World Order,” 59.  
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organization in which the great powers could cooperate and keep the peace – The United 
Nations.”35 While liberal internationalism shared many similarities with the Westphalian system, 
some aspects conflicted with the original model as well. This is evident in the liberal 
international order’s framing of sovereignty. To start, the foundation of the LIO is essentially 
“multilateral institutions, alliances, special relationships, and client states – a hierarchical order 
with liberal characteristics.”36 While both systems valued sovereignty, some form of 
international order and human rights, the idea of sovereignty was altered in the 1990s with the 
introduction of the ‘responsibility to protect.’37 The ‘responsibility to protect’, which will later 
become relevant in the Sri Lankan case study, gives “the international community legal rights 
and obligations to intervene in the affairs of sovereign states.”38 It is on this basis which many 
states, such as Sri Lanka and China, vehemently reject international criminal accountability 
measures; as they are believed to disregard sovereignty in their pursuit of justice.39 
Lastly, before discussing transitional justice as a product of LIO, it is important to 
acknowledge how liberal internationalism has evolved and the status of American hegemony. 
While it is debatable whether or not the United States is still the single global hegemon, there are 
indications that perhaps their influence is weakening since “in the 2000s, following the wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan and the Great Recession, the United States suddenly appeared a less 
effective power.”40 While it is unlikely that liberal international order is to collapse any time 
soon, there are indications that it is both slowing down and being challenged by semi- 
 
35 John G. Ikenberry, “The Future of Liberal World Order,” 60.  
36 Ibid., 61. 
37 Ibid.  
38 Ibid.  
39 Patrick Hein, 11. 
40 John J. Mearsheimer, “Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order,” International Security 
43.4 (2019): 33.  
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authoritarian regimes. For example, when looking at the expansion of democracy, one of the four 
elements of LIO, there is some suggestion that perhaps these norms are no longer appealing;  
The global democratic revolution known as the Third Wave saw the number of 
democracies nearly double after the end of the cold war. However, the trend already 
peaked by 2000, and it faced further setbacks when the unfulfilled promise of the Arab 
Spring and reversals and backslidings in Egypt and Thailand.41 
 
Amitav Acharya argues that the United States itself is abandoning the norms of the LIO, through 
its slow fragmentation of multilateral institutions.42 For example, a process which was already 
underway but expedited by President Trump, the United States has made a conscious effort to 
cast aside the liberal multilateral institutions in place of bilateral trade agreements and direct 
exchange.43  
 Nonetheless, confidence in the LIO remains, as John Ikenberry claims: “liberal 
internationalism has survived its 200-year journey into the current century because, with liberal 
democracy at the core, it offered a coherent and functional vision of how to organize the 
international space.”44 Further to this, rising global powers, such as China and India have 
incentives to participate within the LIO, in the benefit of their state’s interest.45 For example, 
China is already intensely integrated into the world trade system, where “a remarkable 40 
percent of its GNP composed of exports – 24 percent of which go to the United States.”46 Thus, 
while certain parts of the liberal international order are being challenged by global powers, 
confidence remains that the LIO is far too entrenched to be replaced in the near future.  
 
 
41 Amitav Acharya, 274.  
42 Ibid.  
43 Ibid., 273.  
44 John G. Ikenberry, “The End of Liberal International Order?” 10.  
45 John G. Ikenberry, “The Future of Liberal World Order,” 61.  
46 Ibid. 
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1.2 Placing Transitional Justice within the LIO 
 Transitional Justice (TJ) can manifest in a multitude of ways, depending on the context of 
a post-conflict society. The United Nations Secretary General (UNSG) claims that transitional 
justice;  
‘[C]omprises a full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s 
attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure 
accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation. These may include both judicial 
and non-judicial mechanisms, with differing levels of international involvement (or none 
at all) and individual persecutions, reparations, truth-seeking, institutional reform, vetting 
and dismissals, or a combination thereof.’47 
 
There are four common approaches to transitional justice that are prominent in the field; this 
includes, criminal prosecutions, reparations for victims, truth commissions and legal or 
institutional reforms.48 While transitional justice is argued to have been taking place since the 
end of WWII, the term did not come to be used until the late 1980s and early 1990s when a 
considerable political shift away from oppressive regimes was taking place in Latin America.49  
 Ruti Teitel claims that there were four phases of transitional justice, that have led to the 
state of the field today. The first of these phases is known as the Nuremberg Trails; this process 
was arranged by the victors of WWII to address the crimes against humanity and war crimes 
committed by high-ranking Nazi officials.50 While at the time, transitional justice as a political 
term did not exist, Teitel claims that the measures instituted met criteria of TJ.51  The second 
phase of transitional justice is marked by the fall of the Soviet Union; where there was a shift 
“away from Nuremberg-style international tribunals and towards national-level prosecutions 
 
47 Khanyisela Moyo, Postcolonial Transitional Justice: Zimbabwe and Beyond. Routledge, 2019: 14.  
48 Ibid., 12.  
49 Paige Arthur, “How ‘Transitions’ Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History,” Human Rights Quarterly 31.2 
(2009): 334.  
50 Dustin N. Sharp, “Interrogating the Peripheries: The Preoccupations of Fourth Generation Transitional Justice,” 
Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 26(2013): 154.  
51 Ibid.  
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inside the newly democratized or democratizing states.”52 Teitel continues to describe this phase 
as one where there was a general decline in the standards of the rule-of-law.53 This tension 
between accountability and efficacy is a key component, as seen with Argentinian military 
officials.54 There is a perpetual dilemma between attempting to hold perpetrators of war crimes 
accountable and the practical strains of finding a conflict resolution.55 
 The third phase of transitional justice as described by Teitel is known as the ‘Steady-
State’ TJ; in which case the field has moved from the exception to commonplace practices.56 
This was recognized as important in post-conflict societies, as “the question is not whether to 
conduct some form of transitional justice, but what the scope of modalities and sequencing might 
be.”57 The final phase and current phase focuses on the intersection of politics in TJ work.58 
More specifically, balancing the needs of international agencies and local actors, as well as the 
possibility of a victor’s peace as the case of Sri Lanka, will demonstrate.59 Lastly, it is important 
to note that the measures of transitional justice often work towards reproducing liberal forms of 
governance which are not always compatible with a post-conflict state in the Global South. 
 The most challenging component of implementing transitional justice is the rejection of 
its practices due to the perception that Western liberal governments are attempting to impose 
their ideologies onto the transitioning state.60 This complaint frames foreign intervention as an 
infringement of sovereignty, but,  that Western transitional justice mechanisms tend to overlook 
 
52 Dustin N. Sharp, 154. 
53 Ibid.  
54 Ibid., 155.  
55 Khanyisela Moyo, 23.  
56 Dustin N. Sharp, 155.  
57 Ibid., 156. 
58 Ibid.  
59 Ibid., 158. 
60 Briony Jones and Thomas Brudholm, “Introduction: Rethinking Resistance to Transitional Justice,” Conflict & 
Society 2.1(2016): 68 
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local justice and reconciliation mechanisms. 61 Post-conflict societies which are undergoing the 
transitional justice process have often suffered from “torture, extrajudicial executions, 
disappearances, war crimes, crimes against humanity, forced labour or enslavement and 
genocide.”62 Typically, when such grave crimes occur, peacebuilding and transitional justice are 
introduced through pressure from the international community, Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGO’s) and international organizations.63 This results in, local actors often 
feeling disregarded by international actors, as explained by Sriram;  
While an indigenous demand for accountability is undeniably significant in most, if not 
all, countries that have experienced conflict or mass atrocity and repression, the 
repertoires for accountability are formulated largely by external actors, as illustrated in 
the discussion of the policies of the World Bank, United Nations, and UK Department for 
International Development.64 
 
It appears that amongst domestic actors undergoing the transitional justice process, there is a 
common feeling of disconnect from influential international actors, who are dictating or 
contributing to the transitional justice agenda. Ultimately, the most common objection to 
international involvement in the transitional justice process is the argument that the imposition of 
Western norms is unwarranted and not culturally significant in certain post-conflict contexts.65 
 The final critique of transitional justice and its liberal vision is the often-unintentional 
state-centred approach, with little priority given to the victims of violence. While transitional 
justice mechanisms explicitly claim that one of their functions is providing support for victims, 
this is often not the result. An example of this is truth-commissions which often assert that they 
serve to provide a platform for truth claims through public truth-telling in an attempt to 
 
61 Dustin N. Sharp, 161. 
62 Chandra Lekha Sriram, 583. 
63 Ibid.  
64 Ibid., 589.  
65 Briony Jones and Thomas Brudholm, 68.  
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reconnect victims and their communities.66 While this is a legitimate laudable goal, “truth 
commissions operate through the continuing objectification of the victim to support the broader 
aims of the state. Although there is a link between the plight of individuals and inter-communal 
reconciliation, care should be taken not to conflate the concepts of individual and societal 
healing.”67 While international transitional justice initiatives claim to have victims at the centre 
of their discourse a Western lens may overlook solutions that are more applicable in a particular 
cultural context.68 Increasingly the liberal one-size-fits-all approach to transitional justice often 
fails to cater to the context of particular post-conflict societies; particularly those in the Global 
South.  
 This chapter sought to explain the origins and vision of Western Liberal International 
Order. Understanding the origins of the current LIO provides a foundation to effectively analyze 
how China continues to defy these liberal international norms, outlined in the following chapter. 
Furthermore, acknowledging transitional justice as part of the LIO and a Western vision of 
justice provides an additional dimension of analyzing Sri Lanka’s transitional justice record and 
its vigorous rejection of transitional justice mechanisms suggested by the international 





66 Simon Robins, “Failing Victims? The Limits of Transitional Justice in Addressing the Needs of Victims of 
Violations.” Human Rights and International Legal Discourse (2017): 43.  
67 Ibid., 47.  
68 Ibid., 48.  
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China Posing Challenges to Liberal International Norms  
2.1 China’s Historic Resistance to Liberal International Norms  
The beginning of the Korean War in June of 1950 can be seen as the beginning of 
America’s efforts to contain communism in Asia.69 The United States was particularly concerned 
about China’s influence in the Asia-Pacific region following WWII, as “American governments 
were fearful of the People’s Republic of China being able to spread out across East and 
Southeast Asia rather like the Japanese military had been able to take over much of Southeast 
Asian in December 1941 and January 1942.”70 From the 1950s onward, efforts to oppose the 
LIO were most common in the Asia-Pacific regardless of American efforts.71 While the United 
States remained the global hegemon from the end of WWII and following the Cold War in the 
1990s, in the 2000s, this was weakened by the Great Recession of 2008 and its conflicts in 
Afghanistan and Iraq.72 During this time that China began to see massive economic growth and 
rising approval amongst its neighbouring countries due to the Asian financial crisis.73 China’s 
growth was significant in the early 2000s, “since from 2001 onwards, the Chinese economy grew 
increasingly rapidly. From 2003 to 2007, it sustained growth rates of well over 10 per cent per 
year.”74 The Asian financial crisis allowed China to increase its approval by acting as a catalyst 
for struggling states in the Asia-Pacific Region.”75 
In recent decades, China has managed to integrate itself into the LIO, without 
compromising its Community Party or foreign policy strategies. China as an economic hegemon 
 
69 Richard Stubbs, “Order and Contestation in the Asia-Pacific Region: Liberal vs Developmental/Non-
Interventionalist Approaches,” The International Spectator 53.1 (2018): 139.  
70 Ibid. 
71Ibid., 148.  
72 Jennifer Rudolph, 67. 
73 Richard Stubbs, 144.  
74 Ibid.  
75 Ibid.  
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is extremely unique since it “is a booming capitalist economy controlled by a communist party 
that is still guided by the dictum of democratic centralism.”76 The rising challenges to the LIO is 
how China as a global economic power conducts its foreign policy. Shaun Breslin claims that 
there are four pillars of Sino foreign policy, which directly challenge the current LIO. The first 
pillar focuses simply on a “commitment to multilateralism underpinned by the central role of the 
UN as the guarantor of global security.”77  The second pillar prioritizes active dialogue as a 
means of resolving conflict, as opposed to military force.78 The final two pillars are most 
divergent from the LIO, as China boasts a commitment to economic development on a global 
scale; emphasizing that developed states must take it upon themselves to promote growth 
internationally.79 The final pillar encourages inclusivity and “recognizing all societies and 
cultures as coexistent ant equal stakeholders in the global order.”80 However, all of these pillars, 
however, China has emphasized its unwavering respect for state sovereignty.81 
 Beyond China’s foreign policy pillars and its single communist party, China is thought to 
challenge the LIO in its perceived support for authoritarianism. China’s support for authoritarian 
governments accompanied by indirect reinforcement of anti-Western nationalism.82 For example, 
amid ethnic conflict, “China has blindly endorsed the ethnic majority narratives of Tamil and 
Rohingya terrorism in Sri Lanka and Myanmar where domestic elites have emphasized exclusive 
ethnic or religious identities as they bid to win or maintain power.”83 Moreover, China has 
explicitly challenged the LIO on multiple occasions by utilizing its power on the United Nations 
 
76 Horace Campbell, “China in Africa: Challenging US Global Hegemony,” Third World Quarterly 29.1(2008): 94.  
77 Shaun Breslin, “Understanding China’s Regional Rise: Interpretations, Identities and Implications,” International 
Affairs 85.4(2009): 825.  
78 Ibid.  
79 Ibid.  
80 Ibid.  
81 Ibid.  
82 Patrick Hein, 11.  
83 Ibid.  
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Security Council, to prevent attempts at employing international accountability for human rights 
violations or war crimes.84 This has produced a clear divergence of opinions regarding the role of 
transitional justice in the peacebuilding process.85   
 While China continues to remain evasive regarding its specific foreign policy strategies, 
sovereignty has remained its unchanging priority since as early as the 1950s. As mentioned by 
the late Wang Teiya, a former Chinese Jurist, “China regards the principle of sovereignty ‘as the 
cornerstone of the whole system of international law’.”86 However, this is not to say that China is 
isolationist, Beijing accepts that its sovereign powers can be constrained by the global economy. 
Barelli claims that there are two caveats that explain the protective attitudes that the Chinese 
have towards the sovereign principle: “First, China opposes restrictions to sovereignty that are 
non-reciprocal and non-voluntary; and second, it firmly opposes any attempt to conceptually 
undermine sovereignty as the building block of international law and relations.”87 There is 
evidence of China’s efforts to express its anti-liberal sentiments such as a joint declaration with 
Russia that was signed in 2016 confirming the priority of the principles of sovereign equality and 
the avoidance of intervention to maintain global stability.88 Without stating explicit disapproval, 
China’s consistent stance on sovereign equality challenges liberal international norms, such as 
the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine.  
 China’s efforts to uphold sovereign equality principles are rooted in self-preservation and 
the strategy of using these legal principles to protect itself in any attempt from foreign powers to 
interfere with China’s domestic affairs.89 In addition to the Western influence Beijing actively 
 
84 Patrick Hein, 11.  
85 Ibid.  
86 Mauro Barelli, “Preventing and Responding to Atrocity Crimes: China, Sovereignty and the Responsibility to 
Protect,” Journal of Conflict & Security Law 23.2 (2018): 177. 
87 Ibid., 178.  
88 Ibid., 179.  
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rejects, the country also faces a number of security challenges in the Asia-Pacific region further 
incentivising the active campaigning for sovereign equality.90 Current president Xi Jinping 
reiterated this stance when he stated that;  
The principle of sovereignty not only means that the sovereignty and territorial integrity 
of all countries are inviolable, and their internal affairs are not subject to interference. It 
also means that all countries’ right to independently chose social systems and 
development paths should be upheld, and that all countries endeavours to promote 
economic and social development and improve their people’s lives and should be 
respected.91 
 
 Since the early 1950s, China has worked to challenge liberal international norms and 
resisted Western attempts at imposing democratic visions of governance. China expresses its 
preference for Westphalian sovereignty. But it also has led to questionable human rights 
practices and policy abroad. For example, activists have pointed to the examples of Zimbabwe 
and Sudan as instances China’s readiness to support authoritarian governments.92 Therefore, 
China not only opposes the LIO but actively promotes an illiberal system; as will be 
demonstrated in the Sri Lankan case. As China’s economic influence and sovereign equality 
principles continue to grow in popularity in the Global South, it is important to envision the 
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 ‘The Beijing Model’ also referred to as the ‘Chinese Model,’ refers to China’s foreign 
policy strategies, and emphasizes what international order would look like if more regimes 
followed suit. Shaun Breslin claims that the Chinese model has two main dimensions, which act 
as an attractive alternative to many developing or semi-authoritarian states. The first dimension 
refers to “the managed process of re-engagement with the global economy and the maintenance 
of relatively strong state control and/or national ownership of key economic sectors.”93 In this 
way, China has served as an example of the ability for an illiberal political regime to achieve 
substantial developmental and economic success while partially integrated into the LIO. 94 
 Critics such as Ikenberry argue that this model of governance as an example for smaller 
states can be detrimental for the state itself, and the international system generally. For example, 
John Ikenberry claims that the international system functions largely under the ‘Beijing Model’, 
“only works when one or a few states opportunistically exploit and open system of markets. But 
if everyone does it, it is no longer an open system but fragmented, mercantilist and protectionist 
complex, and everyone suffers.”95 Additionally, if the ‘Beijing Model’ does not expand, China 
will likely be forced to acquiesce to more or the norms upheld by liberal international order.96  
 China’s ability to liberalize its economy without altering its illiberal style of governance 
has been key to the Chinese Model.97 However, while this may serve as a model of success for 
authoritarian states, it remains highly unlikely that smaller developing states can mimic China’s 
success.98 Moreover, China has successfully maintained its Communist government without 
submitting to Western liberal pressures, “one of the greatest challenges to US power, it seems, 
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lies in China’s acceptance of at least some of the global norms that successive US governments 
had tried to promote.”99 China does not seek to promote any particular ideology, but rather, 
simply rejects the imposition of liberal ideologies.100 It is unclear if China’s style of governance 
will become more popular in the years to come, however, actors in the Global South are seeking 
alternatives to Western styles of governance.  
 As the Chinese Model of governance grows in popularity, Breslin argues that the gradual 
move towards democracy is inevitable. John Ikenberry addresses the stall in democratic growth 
in recent decades and claims that;  
Although it is true that the spread of democracy has stalled in recent years and that 
authoritarian China has performed well in the recent economic crisis, there is still little 
evidence that authoritarian states can become truly advanced societies without moving in 
a liberal democratic direction.101  
 
While China’s economic growth and maintenance of its ruling Communist party is a notable 
accomplishment, it cannot be ignored that Beijing has inevitably become more integrated into the 
LIO, and thus, compromised some of its inherent anti-Western sentiment.  
China has also been able to cultivate its soft power through its Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) and Foreign Direct Investments (FDI), particularly to developing states such 
as Sri Lanka.102  Lim and Mukherjee describe this as a process in which the receiving state 
accumulates substantial economic benefits whereby China’s model becomes increasingly 
appealing, creating a desire to emulate China’s economic policies in hopes of a similar outcome. 
However, there are several potential shortcomings of weaker developing state’s engaging with 
the ‘Beijing Model.’ First, history has indicated that ODI and FDI in large sums can lead to 
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corruption amongst ruling elites.103 However, more concerning than this is the potential for a 
‘debt trap,’ due to the extreme power dynamics between countries like China and Sri Lanka. 
Mukherjee and Lim explain that: 
Target governments incur debt obligations to sender states when the latter offer 
financing, for example for large infrastructure projects, either on preferential 
terms or on commercial terms. The link between debt and influence originates 
from the legal obligation to repay the loan and any accrued interest. This 
obligation is a source of leverage, since as creditor, the sender can offer debt relief 
in return for other concessions such as land grants, equity stakes, or favorable 
terms on other investment projects.104 
 
This leaves the receiving state in a vulnerable position since, if they defaulted on their debt, they 
are at risk to face the withdrawal of investments and finances they are dependent on, in addition 
to costly legal proceedings. 105 Thus, while the ‘Beijing Model’ remains appealing to developing 
states seeking unconditional and FDI, they are often negotiating from a position of weakness and 
risk incurring substantial debt and corrupt governance. 
 Within recent years, President Xi Jinping as pivoted from the foreign policy path his 
predecessors had paved. Under previous regimes, China had been developing quietly, however 
“under President Xi, China’s foreign policy strategy has seen a significant shift from ‘keeping a 
low profile towards ‘striving for achievement (fenfayouwei), and the establishment of ‘a 
favourable international environment for China’s rejuvenation.”106 This has become evident in 
China’s ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (BRI).107 Announced in 2013, this geopolitical project is not 
only for China to continue its economic development, but also to flex its military power and 
political influence on a global scale.108 This serves as an example of China continuously 
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challenging the unipolarity of the LIO through its economic influence. Additionally, this has 
been a bilateral initiative which challenges the multilateral nature of the LIO.109 Helleiner 
mentions that while there is a loose multilateral framework to the BRI, ultimately it is a 
“structured network for arrangements whose context and reach depend very heavily on China’s 
bilateral relationships with the countries involved and in which liberal lending mechanisms 
dominate.”110 The BRI illustrates how China has diverged from its previous foreign policy 
strategies within the last decade, in addition to how it challenges American hegemony and liberal 
international order.  
 This chapter sought to discuss the unique aspects of China’s foreign policy and how these 
strategies actively challenge Western liberal international order. China has successfully managed 
to maintain an illiberal style of governance while liberalizing its economy and achieving massive 
growth and development over recent decades. While it can be argued that China will be forced to 
conform to liberal norms over time, there remains concern that Beijing’s growing foreign policy 
influence will have detrimental impacts on the human rights practices of the Global South; as 
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Sri Lanka’s Human Rights Record 
3.1: The Sri Lankan Army & a Culture of Impunity 
For nearly three decades the island-nation of Sri Lanka experienced a violent ethnic 
conflict between its majority Sinhalese and minority Tamil population. The Sri Lankan Army 
defeated the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in May of 2009 on the beaches of 
Mullaitivu.111 While the loss of civilian lives to this conflict was normalized both within Sri 
Lanka and globally, the last month of the war received international attention due to a dramatic 
spike in violence.”112 In Sri Lanka’s efforts to conclusively defeat the LTTE, “the final weeks of 
the offensive were marred by criticism from the West and Tamil diaspora of the Sri Lankan 
military’s indiscriminate shelling of the ‘no-fire zone,’ where up to 300,000 civilians were held 
hostage by the LTTE.”113 This chapter will provide the foundation for the Sino-Lankan 
relationship in order to analyze how these two states became more closely intertwined. 
Additionally, it will detail Sri Lanka’s failed transitional justice agenda and its preference for an 
illiberal peace.  
Sri Lanka’s conflict began with ethnocentric politics, immediately following the island’s 
independence from the British Empire.114 During the post-independence era, Tamils were 
increasingly marginalized by ethnocentric policies administered by the Sinhalese government in 
an attempt to appease the Sinhala majority population who were angered by perceived colonial 
disparities.115 These policies began with subject matter such as language and religion and 
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eventually translated to Sinhalese supremacy on an institutional level.116 Ethnic polarization 
continued when the Sri Lankan government brutally oppressed peaceful protests by Tamils 
resulting in the violent mobilization of the LTTE.117 Most mark the beginning of Sri Lanka’s 
civil war as of July 1983, when “in response to the LTTE killing 13 Tamil soldiers, anti-Tamil 
riots broke out throughout the island. The state did nothing to stop the looting and mayhem over 
a seven-day period now referred to as ‘Black July.’”118 During the aftermath of the conflict, 
evidence emerged of both LTTE and the Sri Lankan Army were committing crimes against 
humanity and war crimes. This chapter will only focus on the crimes committed by the Sri 
Lankan government as they relate to the Sino-Lankan relationship. 119 
The final stage of the conflict was led by the Rajapaksa government, who was a regime 
who was determined to defeat the LTTE, regardless of the civilian.120 During this time 
approximately 300 000 civilians were trapped between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan Army’s 
offensive.121 Evidence of war crimes during the final month of conflict involved “the 
government’s killing of civilians through widespread shelling, the shelling of hospitals denial of 
humanitarian assistance, and human rights violations suffered by internationally displaced 
persons and suspected LTTE cadres as well as media and other critics of 
government.”122Additionally, the Sri Lankan army was indiscriminately shelling Tamil civilian 
areas that were designated ‘no-fire zones’ by the state itself.123 The Sri Lankan government also 
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misled the international community when discussing the conflict during the final stages of the 
war as expressed by UN Emergency Relief Coordinator John Holmes, in that “his report 
included assurances from the Sri Lankan government that ‘it had virtually stopped using heavy 
weapons’, but Holmes added ‘it remains unclear how far this is the case in reality.’”124 Despite 
publicly pledging not to use heavy weapons in February of 2009, it became clear that this 
promise was not kept even when LTTE fighters and civilians were tightly mixed in the no-fire 
zone.125 Sri Lanka’s strategy was overt, as Sri Lankan Commander of the Army Sarath Fonseka, 
“Go for the kill, maximum casualties and destruction of the infrastructure of the enemy with 
minimum possible damage to the troops.”126 There was little effort made to protect civilians.  
The Sri Lankan army faces many credible allegations of war crimes beyond those in the 
no-fire zone. There was enough evidence against the Sri Lankan army for prosecutions, since 
“after the war, evidence of more atrocities emerged: videos taken by Sri Lankan soldiers showed 
extrajudicial killings, torture and suggested the sexual assault of female fighters.”127 Throughout 
the decades of conflict and the years following, the GoSL maintained a culture of impunity for 
war criminals of the Sri Lankan Army.128During and after the conflict, it is estimated that 
hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of ethnic Tamils, were displaced and fled the island.129 
One of the most concerning aspects of the Sri Lankan Army’s allegations of war crimes is the 
GoSL’s view that “during the end phase of the war it pursued a ‘humanitarian rescue operation’ 
and maintained a policy of zero civilian casualties.”130 The Sri Lankan Army is not being held 
 
124 Gerrit Kurtz and Madhan Mohan Jaganathan, 98. 
125 Ibid., 108.  
126 Ibid., 104.  
127 Ibid., 108.  
128 Neil DeVotta, “A Win for Democracy in Sri Lanka,” Journal of Democracy 27.1(2016): 162.  
129 Damien Kingsbury, Sri Lanka and the Responsibility to Protect: Politics, Ethnicity, and Genocide.” Routledge, 
2012: 8.  
130 Kristine Höglund and Camilla Orjuela, “Hybrid Peace Governance and Illiberal Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka,” 99.  
 26 
accountable for credible allegations of crimes against humanity and war crimes as the GoSL 
strongly denies Tamil civilian casualties at all. 
The international community waited idly for the conflict to conclude, with knowledge of 
the tactics that the GoSL was using yet chose not to mobilize with a response.131 The post-war 
climate, 
on June 22, 2010, the UN Secretary-General appointed the Panel of Experts on 
Accountability in Sri Lanka (“Panel of Experts”) in order to ‘advise [it] on the issue of 
accountability with regard to alleged violations of the international humanitarian and 
human rights law during the final stages of the armed conflict in Sri Lanka. 132 
 
Despite efforts from the international community to push for accountability from the GoSL, there 
has been little compliance with these suggestions. President Rajapaksa has consistently 
expressed his harsh disapproval of Western hegemony and its disregard for sovereignty and 
strongly opposes any form of international intervention.133 The greatest obstacle to finding 
justice for the civilians who were victims of this conflict is that Sri Lanka remains a non-
signatory to the Rome statute.134 Consequently, the International Criminal Courts (ICC) has no 
jurisdiction, indicating that ultimately the international community does not have a legal 
obligation over the crimes that took place during the civil war.135  
 Over the decade following the civil war in Sri Lanka, evidence that crimes against 
humanity as well as war crimes took place on a large scale at the hands of the Sri Lankan 
government; against Tamil civilians. These crimes include but are not exclusive to, torture, 
sexual assault, extrajudicial killings, the withholding of aid from civilians, and the indiscriminate 
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shelling and bombings of hospitals located in the no-fire zone.136 Despite the evidence and 
pressure from the international community, Sri Lanka has failed to take action, denies the 
allegations, and continues to disregard legitimate minority grievances. In a majoritarian society, 
President Rajapaksa was able to validate state-sponsored violence through “nationalism, 
patronage, and traditional values on his struggle against imperialist Western states and 
terrorism.”137 
3.2 Post-War Violence 
 While Sri Lanka has maintained relative peace after the conflict for over a decade, 
minority injustices continue in a majoritarian post-conflict society. Evidence points toward the 
existence of an illiberal peace in Sri Lanka. There is a concern that because the GoSL has never 
directly confronted the root causes of the conflict, peacebuilding and reconciliation cannot truly 
move forward. Orjuela, Herath and Lindberg claim that;  
The post-war government’s approach to ‘peacebuilding’ and the prevention of renewed 
violence—in a situation where the root causes of the conflict to a large extent remained—
was continued militarization, with an unceasing strong presence of the armed forces in 
the Tamil areas in the northeast of the country, coupled with economic development and 
reconstruction which focused mainly on large infrastructure and lacked popular 
participation (Höglund & Orjuela, 2011).138 
 
This is to argue that Sri Lanka has in no way addressed the ethnic polarization that exists within 
its majoritarian society. Instead, in the aftermath of the conflict, Tamil civilians who express 
legitimate concerns regarding corruption are intimidated into silence through constant military 
presence. Minority concerns are not only involving impunity for war crimes and corruption but 
targeting of ethnically Tamil areas by Sri Lankan forces. 
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 There are two key aspects of Sri Lanka’s post-conflict society: first, that the GoSL’s 
narrative of the war is centred around terrorism, not ethnocentric politics, and second, that the 
majoritarian state operates under a victor’s peace.139 Counterterrorism has been used to 
delegitimize Tamil grievances and conceal the explicitly ethnocentric politics enforced formerly 
by the GoSL. In a post-conflict Sri Lanka minorities are the victims of violence left with little 
dignity or acknowledgement of the abuses that were endured. Typically, conflicts fought in the 
post-Cold War period concluded with either international intervention or the bartering of peace 
agreements, but Sri Lanka does not fit this archetype.140 As the GoSL emerged victorious from 
the civil war this largely dictates the pattern of peace is to follow. While there is currently the 
absence of conflict, Sri Lanka remains far from any form of positive peace. In the post 9/11 
world, the decision to pursue a counterterrorism discourse has allowed the GoSL to legitimize 
state-sponsored violence and human rights abuses. Furthermore, the GoSL has been able to reject 
criticisms on the basis that their actions are “justified through mobilization against liberal 
peacebuilding and intervention of mainly Western powers, which Sri Lankan leaders perceive 
not as liberal but as power-hungry and driven by self-interest.”141 This sentiment echoes China’s 
consistent narrative of the importance of sovereign equality when navigating foreign policy.  
Impunity for war crimes is no longer the only human rights abuses alleged against Sri 
Lanka. Following the government’s defeat of the LTTE over 200 000 Tamils were held in 
internment camps for almost a year in which there was inadequate access to clean drinking 
water, food, or health care.142 During this time, thousands of civilians in these internment camps 
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were forcibly disappeared, assumed murdered, at the hands of Sri Lankan forces.143 The 
continuing violence after the civil war solidified a status of second-class citizenship. Lastly, there 
is not only evidence of the Sri Lankan Army’s human rights violations within its borders, but 
also there have been similarly reported  “incidents of the systematic sexual abuse and rape of 
children reported against the Sri Lanka soldiers who served in the UN peacekeeping missions in Haiti 
and the Central African Republic.”144 The GoSL has not launched any investigation into these 
incidents, nor has there been any repercussions for Army officials.145 The Sri Lankan Army has a 
pattern of behaviour reflecting a blatant disregard for human rights and has promoted a culture of 
impunity for human rights violations and war crimes.  
Despite no longer being in a state of conflict, “bodily crime is widely reported from post-
war Sri Lanka and between 2009 and 2013 the number of complaints received by the police for 
investigation of bodily crimes of sexual nature alone increased by 34%.”146 Furthermore, the 
minority Tamil community has expressed grave concerns regarding the forced disappearances 
and abductions of individuals suspected to be associated with the LTTE by the GoSL; in the 
post-conflict era a Tamil individual is reported missing approximately once every five days.147 
The most concerning aspect of increasing crime statistics within Tamil areas is the ongoing 
militarization of these areas and the looming presence of the Sri Lankan army.148 Based on the 
Sri Lankan Army’s history of violence and abuse a military presence in the North-East may be 
contributing to increasing reports of crime.  
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3.3 Sri Lanka’s Failing Transitional Justice Agenda  
 The Lessons Learned and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) was appointed by the 
GoSL to address international concerns for accountability. The LLRC report was released in 
November 2011 and since its release has been accused of absolving the state from war crimes.149 
The LLRC has been characterized as problematic for several reasons. First, while the sentiment 
behind the LLRC appears to be a truth-seeking transitional justice mechanism, this was openly 
rejected as a concept prior to the GoSL acquiescing to Western pressure abide by international 
law and the norms of LIO.150 Also, the transitional justice process is often meant to be dual-
sided, however,  
an issue that complicates achieving transitional justice is the demise of nearly all LTTE 
personnel who engage in war crimes. Their misdeeds can be documented further, but they 
cannot be punished. Thus, the pursuit of accountability will end up being a one-sided 
affair, and there is simply no support for this among Sri Lanka’s majority Sinhalese.151 
 
So, while transitional justice mechanisms would still serve a legitimate and important purpose in 
Sri Lankan society, without the presence of LTTE cadres it produces an unpopular process to the 
majoritarian victor’s peace.  
 The final report produced by the LLRC, released in December 2011, was accompanied 
by inherent biases associated with the commission, accomplishing little in terms of 
accountability.152 The final report details the atrocities committed by the LTTE, there is little to 
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no discussion regarding the large-scale civilian casualties at the hands of the Sri Lankan 
Army.153 In addition, there were allegations of corruption during the interviewing process, where 
Tamil victims did not feel safe; “for instance, in Kayts Island Jaffna, there were threats against 
witnesses, and in several hearings, witnesses were photographed by security forces.”154 
Moreover, the composition of the LLRC committee was questionable, with minimal ethnic 
diversity, for example, the only Tamil individual apart of the LLRC was also the only woman.155 
Three of the commission members were senior government officials during the period when the 
Sri Lankan army committed the war crimes under question.156 These types of the shortcomings 
of the LLRC and their impaired ability to effectively address the allegations against the Sri 
Lankan Army as well as adequately provide the necessary support and protection of vulnerable 
victims. Sri Lanka’s only effort at a transitional justice mechanism was finally met with a refusal 
to implement any of the suggestions outlined in the LLRC report. For example one of the 
LLRC’s suggestions was the army be withdrawn from civilian areas, following the final report, 
“in 2012, the Sri Lankan state announced in its annual budget that it would continue to expand 
the army instead of demilitarizing. Abductions linked to the security forces continue to this 
day.”157 
 The purpose of this chapter was to introduce the human rights record of Sri Lanka, and its 
current methods of addressing its ongoing allegations of state-sponsored violence. In addition to 
the crimes against humanity and war crimes committed by the Sri Lankan Army against Tamils, 
it has become evident that minorities post-war Sri Lanka are not receiving the support or justice 
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they deserve. Further to this, this chapter sought to express Sri Lanka’s passionate rejection of 
Western intervention and liberal visions of peacebuilding.  
 
The Sino-Lankan Relationship 
 The growth of the Sino-Lankan relationship occurred at the height of Sri Lanka’s civil 
war at a time when the government of Sri Lanka was facing intense scrutiny from Western 
countries. Sri Lanka remained politically volatile and struggled to contain the LTTE however;  
After the Indian (1987-1990), Norwegian (2002-2006) and Japanese (2002-2009) 
diplomatic initiatives reach a political settlement between the Sinhalese and the LTTE 
had failed, China stepped in in 2005 to support the newly elected President Mahinda 
Rajapaksa, who was determined from the beginning to defeat the LTTE.158 
 
Rajapaksa welcomed China’s support as it was the first offer of economic, financial, military and 
diplomatic aid that was virtually unconditional.159 The United States and Western countries 
continuously expressed disapproval for the Rajapaksa regime and its aggressive military tactics 
with the LTTE eventually declining to provide aid at a time when it was desperately needed.160 
China was a willing and expedient partner providing the Sri Lankan state with approximately 
US$12.4 billion from 2005 to 2014 alone.161 China helped to support Sri Lanka’s economy 
during a time of conflict and played an important role in the defeat of the LTTE. China’s 
intervention supplemented a decline in military aid due to Western arms embargoes.162 The 
urgency to defeat the LTTE resulted in a loss of incentive to appease Western concerns. China 
continues to provide military aid for Sri Lanka in order to maintain its peace through heavy army 
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presence in the north and eastern parts of the island.163 Sri Lanka received unconditional aid and 
was able to maintain its sovereignty and have control over the conclusion of its conflict; 
something Rajapaksa desired since entering office.  
 Sino-Lankan relations are complex as the strong relationship is multi-faceted. There are 
several reasons that a closer relationship with Beijing is beneficial to Sri Lanka. China’s support 
for Sri Lanka was not merely in unconditional aid, but in diplomatic aid at the international level. 
Following the conflict, the Sri Lankan government greatly benefited from having a powerful ally 
on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) since China ensured that no resolution would be 
delivered against Sri Lanka.164 In addition to this, China alongside Russia helped dismantle a 
Swiss resolution by “congratulating Sri Lanka on eliminating terrorism, liberating the north, 
addressing the needs of Tamil refugees and also reaffirming the ‘principle of non-interference in 
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of states.’”165 China also made 
significant investments in infrastructure on the island by providing $1.2 billion to build a port, 
railways, an airport, railways, and various other projects.166 China also increased Sri Lanka’s 
nonconditional aid, by fivefold, between 2005 and 2009.167 With the financial support of China, 
the Government of Sri Lanka was able to circumvent possible culpability in the civil war crimes 
and pursue an illiberal form of peace.  
 There are several reasons that liberal peacebuilding was inconvenient and undesirable for 
Sri Lanka. More than the infringement on sovereignty the values promoted by liberal 
international order place a great deal of accountability on the state.168 For example, one of the 
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principles of liberal peacebuilding is that typically, “armed conflicts had ‘root causes’ – well-
founded grievances articulated by defined social groups – that needed to be addressed to ensure 
sustainable resolution of conflicts.”169 In the Sri Lankan context this would require the Rajapaksa 
government to acknowledge the political grievances of the Tamil community and the faults of its 
regime. Furthermore, liberal peacebuilding tends to place blame on authoritarian governments in 
conflict as opposed to guerilla groups.170 
 On the diplomatic level, China ensured that Sri Lanka’s sovereignty is upheld as an act of 
self-preservation. China’s campaign against a low-level Uighur insurgency in Xinjiang also 
relied on authoritarian mechanisms and state coercion.”171 Similar to Sri Lanka, following 9/11, 
China utilized counterterrorism to legitimize its treatment of the Uighur population in the same 
way as the Rajapaksa regime did. Sri Lanka as an island has geopolitical significance to China, 
as it is a location in China’s Belt & Road initiative.172 China’s efforts to ensure Sri Lanka 
remains a stable unitary state is due in part to the economic plans for the region and to make Sri 
Lanka a ‘Pearl’ on China’s ‘String of Pearls.’173 Furthermore, China’s increasing long-term 
presence in the region is key to challenging the regional superpower, India.174 Sri Lanka is a 
beneficiary of the regional geopolitical rivalry between India and China.  
 The American response to growing relations between Sri Lanka and China has been 
disapproval. Firstly, the two UNHRC resolutions created “were opposed by China and other 
countries backed by China and they accused the United States of infringing on the sovereignty of 
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Sri Lanka.”175 Fernando argues that in fact, the United States’ campaign for accountability is not 
for the championing of human rights but fear of China’s increasing authority on the island.176 
This was demonstrated by the American response to Sri Lanka’s regime change in 2015 when a 
pro-Western president came into office the United States quickly eased its pressure on the 
accountability for human rights violations.177 Additionally, the United States postponed a 
UNHRC report regarding the allegations against the Sri Lankan Army until September 2015.178 
A Pro-Western government in Sri Lanka was significant to the United States due to impending 
fear of Chinese influence in the region and Sri Lanka’s geopolitical value. American concerns 
are apparent: “In August 2018, The Pentagon released the 2018 China Military Power Report, 
and at the beginning of the report gives the example of Hambantota Port as proof of China’s 
efforts to expand its regional global presence.”179 While Sri Lanka functioned under a pro-
Western government for a short period following the civil war the head of state is a member of 
the Rajapaksa family. In recent years, the United States has expressed its suspicions of China in 
South Asia, as Vice President Mike Pence explicitly criticized China for its relations with Sri 
Lanka, claiming that the island is being led into a ‘debt trap.’180 Pence claimed that, in turn, Sri 
Lanka’s inability to pay for the port and its associated commercial risks, eventually it will 
become a Chinese naval base.181  
 Sri Lanka may appear to be a minor player in the power-relations between China and the 
United States, it is representative of a greater and growing challenge to the existing liberal 
international order. This chapter explored the increasingly close relations between China and Sri 
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Lanka and outlined the economic influence that China has had over the island. It demonstrated 
China’s role in ending Sri Lanka’s civil conflict and its support in helping the regime maintain an 
illiberal majoritarian peace model.  This chapter examined the role of China in developing Sri 
Lanka’s infrastructure and how that has translated into influence over the island. It is also 
important to assess the American response to this relationship in its efforts to uphold democracy 
and liberal values as well as the process of transitional justice. While it remains unlikely that 
liberal international order will be dismantled in the near future, China continues to challenge the 
system and establish new ways for illiberal governance to function and sustain itself within the 
LIO. 
Conclusion 
This case study sought to illustrate China’s ability to challenge Western norms and liberal 
international order by offering an alternative model for illiberal states exemplified through the 
Sino-Lankan relationship. This paper detailed the origins of the current liberal international order 
and principles upheld by the West. The United States has for decades championed values and 
focused on policy measures that support multilateral institutions, a free market, the spread of 
democracy. In addition to this transitional justice remains an important by-product of liberal 
international order which the West encourages in post-conflict societies. Transitional justice 
measures include a Western for countries emerging from conflict, in hopes of imploring a 
democratic transition. In the Sri Lankan case, this has been seen to be an act of self-interest in 
order to expand Western influence. The second chapter outlined China’s historic resistance to 
liberal international norms, and ways in which the communist state conducts foreign policy today.  
While Beijing claims to have no desire to become a global hegemon it is expected its sphere of 
influence and promotes of anti-Western and anti-liberal values. The Chinese Model offers 
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diplomatic and economic benefits to states who do not wish to conform to the LIO. The third 
chapter outlined the Sri Lankan context and the literature on its human rights record and how its 
transitional justice agenda has failed. Finally, the concluding chapter discussed the Sino-Lankan 
relationship and its obligations to the liberal international order. At the height of the conflict, Sri 
Lanka had multiple failed international peace negotiations and a regime determined to defeat the 
LTTE whereby China intervened and supported the Government of Sri Lanka through to its victory 
over the conflict. The unconditional aid provided by China allowed for Sri Lanka to acquire the 
necessary military support to defeat the LTTE. Additionally, China’s ongoing diplomatic support 
prevented Sri Lanka’s referral to the ICC and allowed for the island to circumvent the allegations 
of war crimes and crimes against humanity. China has been able to benefit from its investments of 
infrastructure in Sri Lanka and its geopolitical addition to its ‘String of Pearls.’182 China 
successfully impeded the transitional justice agenda imposed by the West in Sri Lanka, and instead 
upheld its principles of sovereign equality and was able to strategically benefit from Sri Lanka’s 
political situation. While China offers alternative options to democracy for developing states it 
also erodes the standard of upholding human rights that were constructed by liberal international 
order.  Although it remains unlikely that liberal international order will collapse, it is evident that 
the United States remains threatened over China’s growing influence in the region, as well as the 
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